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Payments for ecosystem services often are viewed as an innovative approach toward improving natural
resource management, while also providing opportunities for enhancing incomes and livelihoods. Yet not
all PES programs are designed and implemented in ways that reﬂect voluntary transactions between
buyers and providers of well-deﬁned, measurable ecosystem services. When third-party interests, such
as donors or governments, design PES programs to achieve goals that lie outside the conceptual scope of
payments for ecosystem services, the improvements in resource management and enhancements in
livelihoods can fall short of expectations. We examine this potential dissonance in PES program
implementation, taking the case of PES in the forestry sector in Vietnam. We question whether PES in
Vietnam has the potential to enhance forest protection and watershed management. We highlight the
importance of institutions and governance (i.e., the policies, rules, and regulations) in determining
program signiﬁcance and we illustrate how PES programs are implemented as part of the government's
subsidy scheme. We conclude that in the absence of a competitive market structure and appropriate
regulations, governments can reshape PES programs to function primarily as tools for strengthening state
control over natural resources.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Paying for ecosystem services (PES) has been described as an
innovative approach for improving natural resource management
(Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Pagiola, 2008). Presented originally in the
forest conservation literature, PES programs now include efforts to
enhance watershed protection, motivate carbon sequestration, and
beautify landscapes (Landell-Mills and Poras, 2002). Early promo-
ters envisioned that PES programs would transform conservation
practices from costly requirements to potential sources of revenue
(Kinzig et al., 2011). Thus, individuals and communities would be
ﬁnancially motivated to engage in mutually beneﬁcial agreements
regarding resource management. PES programs have also beenr B.V.
x: +856 21 770076.
il.com (G. Lestrelin),
Open access under CC BY-NC-Nlinked to efforts to alleviate global poverty (Bulte et al., 2008;
Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Wunder, 2008).
PES programs have been seen by some as an approach for
improving environmental amenities without relying on regulatory
agencies to implement restrictive policies. Voluntary agreements
between individuals generating externalities and those impacted
by them might be more effective in reducing harmful impacts in a
shorter time than is required to craft and adopt environmental
legislation. In a sense, PES programs address the classic problem of
negative externalities by creating a market setting in which the
externalities are internalized. Ideally, the amount of compensation
paid for modifying or ending a harmful activity is determined
through negotiations in which the ‘market participants’ evaluate
their incremental beneﬁts and opportunity costs. As deﬁned by
Wunder (2005 p. 50) PES program design should incorporate the
following principles: “(1) a voluntary transaction in which (2) a
well-deﬁned environmental service (or a land use likely to secure that
service) (3) is ‘bought’ by a (minimum of one) buyer (4) from a
(minimum of one) provider (5) if and only if the provider continu-
ously secures the provision of the service (conditionality)”.
While the approach is attractive, in reality it is hard to ﬁnd PES
programs that fulﬁll all the above-deﬁned principles (To et al.,
2012; Vatn, 2010). PES programs do not automatically bring
together potential buyers and sellers of environmental servicesD license.
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contrary, PES programs often are implemented using donor funds
or as part of government-subsidized compensation programs
focused primarily on how to pay people for generating external
beneﬁts (Munoz-Pina et al., 2008; Pagiola, 2008; Wunder and
Alban, 2008). In practice, most buyers of ecosystem services in the
PES programs implemented worldwide are intermediate parties,
such as governments and non-governmental organizations, rather
than direct beneﬁciaries (Pham et al., 2010; Shelley, 2011). To date,
the public sector has been the largest purchaser of ecosystem
services, and Milder et al. (2010) expect this trend to continue.
Recently, Muradian and Rival (2012) have proposed shifting the
emphasis from trying to create purely market-oriented mechan-
isms to designing incentives for environmental protection.
We discuss the dissonance in PES program design (Wunder,
2005) and implementation. It looks at how PES is presented as an
innovative, alternative policy measure to improve natural resource
management and enhance livelihoods vis-à-vis persistent pro-
blems and challenges in PES program implementation. Current
debates in natural resource management tend to view this
dissonance mainly under the notion of ‘implementation barriers’,
or as a failure to create the conditions required for effective policy
implementation (Hebinck and Verschoor, 2001; Mollinga and
Bolding, 2004). We argue that such dissonance can also occur
when policy actors (international, national, sub national and local)
perceive and interpret the problem differently. While we focus
speciﬁcally on forest protection and watershed management, we
echo broader policy discussions about dissonance in natural
resource management in general. Mosse (2004, p. 640) for instance,
analyzes this dissonance by examining development aid policy and
questioning whether good policy is implementable in the ﬁrst
place: “What if the things that make for good policy are quite different
from those that make it implementable?” We argue that under-
standing this dissonance is pertinent to increase the actual sig-
niﬁcance of PES program implementation and better understand
the potential to enhance natural resource management, as opposed
to treating it as a panacea.
We show that while PES program signiﬁcance is determined in
part by the institutions in which the program operates, the range
of possibilities to select appropriate institutional arrangements
might be limited by the existing governance structure (i.e. policies,
rules, and regulations) in a speciﬁc country. Taking Vietnam as our
case study, we highlight the important role played by the state in
shaping PES program implementation. We discuss how the idea of
market environmentalism may be deployed strategically as a
means to increase state power in natural resource management.
We illustrate how PES program implementation is predeﬁned by the
way the state views the program as a means to collect additional
revenue for forest protection.
To these ends, we describe the Government of Vietnam's (GoV)
various efforts in forest protection, and how the GoV currently
incorporates PES as part of its forest protection and watershed
management policies. We consider also the possibility that the
GoV might be using PES programs to expand and strengthen state
control over natural resources and the people who use them.
Indeed, by prescribing speciﬁc activities within certain spatial
boundaries, these programs may contribute to state territorializa-
tion (Peluso and Lund, 2011; Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995). When
this occurs, a PES program functions primarily as a government's
subsidy scheme (McAfee and Shapiro, 2010).2. Nature, market environmentalism, and the state
The notion of paying for ecosystem services was presented
originally in the environmental economics literature, where manyauthors consider the environment to be an integral component of
economic decisions (Coase, 1960; Perrings et al., 1995). Early
authors describe the systematic undervaluation of ecosystem
services in economic decision making, which arises in part
because the services provided by natural capital are not ade-
quately quantiﬁed in terms that are comparable with the eco-
nomic services from manufactured capital (Costanza et al., 1997).
In line with this argument, the concept of ecosystem services is
perceived by many conservationists merely as a tool for commu-
nicating the value of ecosystem functions, using a language that
reﬂects the dominant political economic perspectives (Gomez-
Baggethun et al., 2010).
Over time, and with experience, the notion of paying for
ecosystem services has gained favor as an analytical framework
that allows ecologists to develop stronger theories, and to docu-
ment empirically how the stock of nature delivers ﬂows of services
(Carpenter et al., 2006). From Norgaard (2010, p. 1219): “Economic
services became a paradigm for thinking about development and the
environment and for designing environmental management pro-
grams. Over a period of about 15 years, an eye opening metaphor
intended to awaken society to think more deeply about the impor-
tance of nature and its destruction through excessive energy and
material consumption transformed into a dominant model for envir-
onmental policy and management in developing countries and for the
globe as a whole”.
The transformation from a communication tool to analytical
framework has placed PES programs more clearly in the context of
market environmentalism, which promotes the pricing of nature's
services, the assignment of property rights, and the expansion of
commodity markets into the realm of nature's services (Berthoud,
1992). This transformation, together with an increasing ﬂow of
funds from international donors, such as the Global Environmental
Fund of the World Bank, promoting implementation of PES
programs in developing countries, has given the concept a life of
its own (Pagiola and Platais, 2007). In recent years, PES programs
have been featured in national decrees and adopted as a preferred
environmental strategy by international organizations. National-
level PES programs have been implemented in several countries of
Latin America (Munoz-Pina et al., 2008; Pagiola, 2008; Wunder
et al., 2008). Several countries in Southeast Asia have incorporated
PES as part of their national legislation, and others are considering
to mainstream PES as part of their natural resource management
policies (Emerton and Lopaying, 2011; Wunder et al., 2005). PES
programs have been successful in highlighting the important roles
of ecosystem services in economic decision making. They have also
promoted privatization in natural resource management.
The spread of market environmentalism as alternative idea for
nature conservation correlates with a changing role of the state in
natural resource management. The declining role of the state in
governance issues in general and in natural resource manage7-
ment in particular has been widely discussed in political science
(Migdal, 1988; 2001; Schulte-Nordholt, 2003; Scott, 1987), geo-
graphy (Harvey, 1989; Cox, 1997; Escobar, 2001) and legal anthro-
pology literature (Benda-Beckmann, 1981; Benda-Beckmann, von
Strijbosch, 1986). Authors have described how the state has been
hollowed out (Jessop, 2004), and how particularizing and uni-
versalizing tendencies beyond the state now interact in a process
of glocalization (Swyngedouw, 1997). Nonetheless, current
research has shown how nation–states can reposition and reorient
their role in natural resource management, amidst pressure from
international, regional and local levels, through different regula-
tory measures and public–private partnerships (Bakker, 2010).
Using neo-liberalism and market environmentalism perspectives
as her entry points, Bakker shows that the state can actually
sustain its power through reregulation, and that increased parti-
cipation of non-state actors does not necessarily result in reduced
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Heynen et al., 2007) have reached similar conclusions on how
states can sustain their power through reregulation and reorienta-
tion of their roles.
We show how the Vietnamese state can sustain its role and
importance in natural resource management by relying on private
and international contributions to co-ﬁnance forest and watershed
protection policies through PES programs. Taking Bakker's analysis
forward, we illustrate how the Vietnamese government has been
able to use the very notion of neo-liberalism as an entry point to
sustain and increase state power in natural resource management.
We argue that the decision to adopt PES programs as part of national
natural resource management policies is derived from the way the
government views the idea of market environmentalism in PES as a
means to justify forest protection goals and measures. Somewhat
ironically, the way the government has co-opted the idea of market
environmentalism does not result in privatization or the reduction
of state power, but rather in additional ﬁnancial resources to
implement the government's policies in forest protection.
We argue that PES program implementation in Vietnam does
not correspond with the basic principles of PES program design
(Wunder, 2005) mainly because the state deﬁnes payment
mechanisms and valuation, and the state compels participation
from both buyers and providers of ecosystems services. In addi-
tion, the way the state shaped PES programs as part of its
governance structure in natural resource management highlights
how the programs can be potentially used as a tool for state
territorialization (Vandergeest, 1996). The positioning of PES
programs as a tool to pursue state territorialization is conditioned
by two factors: (1) the relative absence of market structure and
PES mechanisms in the region; and (2) the relative absence of
community-based organizations and civil society groups in the
context of (forest) protection and watershed management.3. Forest protection, watershed management, and PES in
Vietnam
The Government of Vietnam ﬁrst relied on state enterprises to
manage forests and protect watersheds, prior to engaging in the
devolution of forest tenure. The GoV progressively integrated
compensation programs and ﬁnally introduced PES mechanisms.
We examine PES implementation in two pilot projects in Vietnam:
Lam Dong Province in the Central Highlands and Son La Province
in the north. We interviewed key informants and conducted semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders involved in pilot project
implementation, including staff members from the Forest Protec-
tion Development Fund (FPDF), the provincial/district/commune
People's Committee, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment (MARD), and their representatives at provincial and
district level, as well as hydropower dam operators and interna-
tional agencies. While we did not directly interview farmers in
these two pilot areas, we gained insight regarding how farmers
perceive ﬁnancial incentives in forest conservation through
research on forest lands allocation in Da Bac District, Hoa Binh
Province, where we interviewed 21 farming households and
conducted 14 focus group discussions. In that effort, we examined
speciﬁcally the impacts of Programs 327 and 661.
3.1. Vietnam's forest protection policies
Since the 1960s, Vietnam has tried several methods to protect
and manage its forests through the allocation of forest lands
(mainly those categorized as special use and protection forests)
to state organizations, cooperatives, and individual households.
7 In 1968, the state allocated forest lands to state enterprises incharge of forest management. In 1988, in line with Resolution 10 of
the Politburo (dated on 5 April 1988), the state allocated forest
lands to cooperatives and other organizations as a response to the
failure of state enterprises to protect forest lands.
In 1991, Vietnam began allocating forest lands to households
and individuals through the provision of land use rights, made
possible by the Law on the Protection and Development of Forests.
In 1992, the state launched a national forest protection program
(Decision 327/CP), with the goal of increasing the productivity of
barren land and hills to achieve ‘ﬁxed’ cultivation. In response to
the program's failure to achieve the expected targets (see also
Vien, 2001 on the achievements and shortcomings of this pro-
gram), the state set forth another program (Decision 661/QD-TTg)
in 1998, aimed at afforestation of ﬁve million hectares.
This program, known also as the 5 Million Hectare Reforesta-
tion Program (5MHRP), endeavors to increase forest cover to 43%
by 2010 (Wunder et al., 2005). Funded by the national govern-
ment, this program targets forest protection and poverty reduc-
tion. It offers cash incentives to farmers who replant trees and
protect existing forests through forest contracts with individual
households. In practice, however, the program has been focused
mainly on forest protection rather than improving the living
standards of farmers and other residents (Clement and Amezaga,
2009). Focusing mainly on national policy demand, local commu-
nity needs were often ignored. This has discouraged local com-
munities from participating in forest protection (Forest Sector
Monitoring Information System (FOMIS) (2010)).
In general, forest protection policies in Vietnam have also been
hampered by the persistent lack of ﬁnancial mechanisms to ensure
forest protection by local actors. While government policies assign
the responsibility to local governments (i.e. Commune People's
Committees) for forest management and protection, these policies
do not provide any ﬁnancial mechanism or measure for establish-
ing income generating organizations for forest protection (Forest
Sector Monitoring Information System (FOMIS) (2010)). In turn, as
local governments lack the mechanisms to generate funds, they
also lack ﬁnance to implement forest protection policies. As a
result, many forests have been destroyed (Nguyen, 2009). Simi-
larly, (state) forest companies lack the funds for forest protection
and they have difﬁculty raising capital on the basis of forest values
(Sikor, 1998). The 5MHRP in particular, while promoting subsidies,
has not increased the speed of transition to market-oriented
mechanisms.
3.2. Payments for Forest Ecosystem Services (PFES) as a means to
collect additional revenue for forest protection
In 2007 the Asia Regional Biodiversity Conservation Program
(ARBCP) funded by USAID assisted the Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural Development (MARD) to develop a pilot policy on Payment
for Forest Environmental Services (PFES) in Vietnam (the Prime
Minister Decision on The Pilot Policy for Payment for Forest
Environmental Services, 10 April 2008). The policy identiﬁed
publicly owned electric and water utilities (i.e. Electricity of
Vietnam and the Sai Gon Water Company) as the ‘service buyers’,
directing their role in water regulation and soil conservation
services. It identiﬁed local farmers, local farming households and
local farming communities who had already been allocated forest
lands as the ‘service providers’. Pilot testing activities were
conducted in two provinces: Lam Dong and Son La.
According to the Prime Minister Decision, the operators of
hydropower facilities, water supply companies and tourism busi-
nesses must contribute a small portion of their revenue into a
centrally managed fund (Forest Protection Development Fund or
FPDF) that is allocated to districts in their respective watersheds.
The norm of payment for forest environmental services, applied for
1 Article 13 in Decision 380/TTg provides guidance for applying the K
coefﬁcient to different forest areas to determine their relative value, based on an
average of four factors: forest type (special use, protection, production); quality of
forest (rich, moderate, poor); origin of forest (natural, planted); and human impacts
(near to roads, remote forest area).
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40 VND/m3 of clean water, while tourism companies contribute 1%
of their annual gross revenues. The fund is being used to compen-
sate households for providing forest environmental services.
Both in Lam Dong and Son La Provinces, PFES was applied
through forest contracts involving the Province People's Commit-
tee and, respectively, the state forest enterprise and local commu-
nities. In the absence of a state forest enterprise, the provincial
authorities arrange forest contracts with farming communities and
individual households. In general, the forest contracts do not
include land use changes in terms of promoting certain types of
land use for forest protection, as opposed to agricultural cultiva-
tion (as in the case of Programs 327 and 661). Rather, it ensures
that local community will deliver the following services: main-
taining and improving the forest and soil through regular patrol-
ling; installing signs provided by the province for demarcating the
boundaries of the contracted areas; and applying preventive
measures to avoid forest ﬁres in the dry season (Winrock
International, 2011).
While PFES programs in Lam Dong can be considered successful,
in terms of achieving higher collected payments, PFES implementa-
tion in Son La was hampered by delayed payments and coordina-
tion problems. According to our key informant from the FPDF in
Lam Dong: “PFES implementation in Lam Dong is faster and more
effective because 90% of forest lands are still managed by the State
Forest Enterprise. As in the case of Son La, most forest lands have been
allocated to individual household. Hence, more efforts were required
with regard to payment arrangements” (interview with FPDF staff,
March 2013). This highlights the importance of transaction costs in
PES implementation.
For Lam Dong speciﬁcally, the government has received 7sig-
niﬁcantly higher revenue to ﬁnance its forest protection measures
through PFES implementation. From Chiramba et al. (2011): “In
2009 the average household payment was VND 8.1 to 8.7 million
(approximately US$ 440 to 470), rising to VND 10.5 to 12 million
(approximately US$ 540 to 615) in 2010. These payments are around
four times higher than forest protection payments received under
former national government policies”. Following the Prime Minis-
terial Decision on pilot PFES (2008), hydropower companies, water
supply and tourism entities signed Memorandums of Understanding
with the government in 2009, to commit US$ 3.4 million to protect
more than 220,000 ha of forests and ecosystem services they
provide. By the end of the pilot implementation phase in 2010, the
FPDF had received more than US$ 5.5 million. Payments were made
to 22 Forest Management Boards, State Forest Enterprises, and to
9870 households (6858 of which are ethnic minorities) (Winrock
International, 2011).
Formally, PFES programs in Son La cover 379,272 ha of forest
land, 45,000 farm households, and 6000 household groups and
communities. PFES funds were collected from two hydropower
plants and one water supply company, with an average payment of
VND 350,000/ha/year. In practice, however, the government has
not been able to identify all the forest owners and has not
completed the review of forest area and forest quality that have
been allocated to households in the pilot site, so that payment has not
been made in a timely manner to farming households (Government of
Vietnam (2010)).
Despite the pilot program's success in generating greater
government revenue for forest protection, PFES program imple-
mentation has remained challenging (interview with Director of
FPDF, March 2013). This is due to the following issues: (1) Equal
payment for all does not encourage people to improve forest
quality, (2) There is unequal revenue generation for forest
conservation across basins, and (3) There is no monitoring
of actual impacts. To date, the GoV has not applied theK coefﬁcient1, which technically would provide a more accurate
link between the amount of payment and the type of forest quality
protected. Moreover, PFES programs rely mainly on the environ-
mental fees collected from hydropower operators. In areas where
there are no hydropower dams, it is difﬁcult to collect sufﬁcient
funds from other sources (i.e., water supply companies and
tourism). In addition, government staff members lack the ability
to analyze data with regard to actual impacts. In Lam Dong, the
authorities have two water quality monitoring stations, but they
lack the professional staff and expertise needed to analyze
the data.
Moreover, whether or not PES can provide a substantial source of
income for farming households remains questionable. For example,
To et al. (2012) show how PES implementation in Lam Dong and Son
La does not guarantee long-term beneﬁts for farming households.
Small land holdings (average of two hectares), ambiguous land
tenure (Sikor and Thanh, 2007), short duration of contracts (1 year),
and elite captures (Peter et al. 2009) are among the factors that cause
unequal distribution of beneﬁts. From To et al. (2012, p. 245): “only
about 10% of village households gained access to PES beneﬁts, whereas
the remaining 90% who held unrecognized customary tenure without a
contract were excluded from beneﬁts”.
Nevertheless, in 2010, the GoV endorsed PFES implementation
as a national program with the promulgation of a Government
Decree on the Policy on Payment for Forest Environment Services
(24 September 2010). Prior to the introduction of PFES programs
and through earlier forest protection programs (i.e. Decision 327,
Decision 661), the government provided support of 200,000 VND/
ha/year to provincial authorities for their forest conservation
programs. The pilot in Lam Dong shows however, that forest
protection programs can be ﬁnanced through private sector and
public contributions (i.e. electricity consumers), with higher rates
up to 450,000/ha/year (interview with Director of FPDF in Lam
Dong, March 2013). The increase in payment shows how 7PFES
program implementation can generate additional sources of rev-
enue for forest and watershed protection.
The government's interest in using PES as a means to collect
additional revenue for forest protection is evident in the follow7-
ing sentence in the Vietnam Forest Sector Progress Report 7
(Forest Sector Monitoring Information System (FOMIS) (2010),
7p. 75):“With the implementation of the Decree No. 99/2010/ND-
CP on the policy for payment for forest environmental services, gross
output value of services will increase from VND 662 billion to 1400
billion during 2011–2015”. Moreover, from the same report (Forest
Sector Monitoring Information System (FOMIS) (2010), p. 73):“If
half of the planned capacity of hydroelectric generation stations are
operated in accordance with nation-wide electric development plan
up to 2015 (with vision to 2025), for which the Prime Minister has
approved, a total capacity of 40 billion Kwh/year from hydroelectric
will be produced, then the forestry sector can collect 800 billion VND
per year (equivalent to yearly average investment from funds under
program 661), which can be calculated to forestry's sector gross
output value of services”.
Following the promulgation of the Government Decree on
PFES, programs should be implemented in 26 provinces in Viet-
nam, including Hoa Binh, Dong Nai, Binh Thuan, Ninh Thuan, and
Ho Chi Minh City. In theory, the FPDF serves as a key ﬁnancial
component of Vietnam's ﬁrst decentralized budget-transfer
mechanism. Ofﬁcially, the fund is overseen by an “independent”
governing body comprised of representatives from District
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District Natural Resources and Environment, Department of Plan-
ning and Investment, Department of Taxation, Department of
Industry and Trade, and the State Treasury, who together appoint
the fund's managers. In practice, however, it is not always clear
who has responsibility to manage the fund at which adminis-
trative level (national, provincial, district, or commune).
In general, unclear funding arrangements (i.e. unclear contractual
arrangements with households, group of households, or commu-
nities, and the unclear channeling of funds to forest management
boards, state forest enterprise) have become a major issue that has
delayed PFES implementation in the other 26 provinces in Vietnam,
following the promulgation of the PFES decree in 2010. For example,
in Hoa Binh, Dong Hai Province and Ho Chi Minh City, government
authorities are currently discussing the formulation of technical
guidelines regarding the selection of participating communes and
villages, the payment formula, and the government agencies
involved in the program.
Slow PFES program implementation on the ground does not mean
that the government is lacking funds for program implementation.
According to the Director of FPDF of Lam Dong, the province has
collected about US$ 6.5 million per year as part of its PFES programs.
Similarly, Hoa Binh Province received US$ 334,000 from the Hoa Binh
hydropower company in 2012, but the People's Committee is still in
the process of formulating the distribution process for this fund. In
general, the government has managed to collect about US$ 50 million
for PFES program implementation nationally (personal communica-
tion with Director FPDF, March 2013).
To summarize, the implementation of PES programs in Vietnam
has little to do with the idea of privatization. Rather, PES is a
mechanism to encourage the incorporation of ﬁnancial incentives as
part of the government's national strategy regarding natural resource
management. The role of PES programs in sustainable natural resource
management will depend on whether or not the GoV can secure
sufﬁcient funds (mainly from hydropower companies) to support
long-term PES program implementation, and whether the GoV can
ensure that the payments generate positive impacts in terms of
environmental protection and improving livelihoods.4. The shaping of PES as a potential tool for internal
territorialization
The way the GoV shapes PES mechanisms as a means to collect
additional revenue raises the question of the possible use of PES
programs as a tool for internal territorialization. In general,
increased government revenue does not necessarily have to result
in increased direct state control of forest resources or in state
regulation of local communities' roles in forest protection. Never-
theless, taking into account the state's centralized governance
structure and decision-making framework in Vietnam, it is likely
that the state would use additional (ﬁnancial) resources to gain
greater control in forest and watershed management.
Below, we discuss the shaping of PES as a potential tool for
internal territorialization, within the context of forest protection in
Vietnam, referring mainly to the following factors: (1) the ambig-
uous legal status of the local community and the positioning of
forest lands as state property; (2) the positioning of PES funds as
part of the government revenue system; and (3) the way PES
program implementation relies on government structure and
apparatuses from the national level to the local level.4.1. Ambiguous legal status of local community and the positioning
of forest lands as state property
The ambiguous legal status of local communities, together with
the positioning of forest lands as state property, can serve as a
starting point for controlling land uses and the livelihood activities
of local communities (Peluso and Lund, 2011).
In the current Vietnamese legal system, the legal status of
community has not been clearly conﬁrmed. The 2005 Civil Law has
not recognized a community as a legal entity. Thus, despite the
current acknowledgment of community as forest owners, as
stipulated in the Law for Forest Protection and Development
(1991, 2004), their rights are limited to the right to use the
allocated forest lands. Unlike other forest owners (i.e. state forest
enterprise), local communities lack the right to convert, transfer,
rent, or mortgage forest lands. Moreover, communities are allo-
cated forest lands but are not permitted to borrow from the state
budget, as are other forest owners. In Lam Dong province, most
forest owners may only sign short-term contracts, due to their
unclear land tenure rights (Sikor and Thanh, 2007). In addition,
some forest lands have been allocated to communities, but the
communities lack any legal status to manage the land in line with
their development interests.
The Land Law of Vietnam (1993, 2003) stipulates that land,
including forest lands, is the property of the entire Vietnamese
people and is uniformly managed by the state. In line with this
notion of positioning the state as the sole land manager, the law
ensures that land allocation to farmers and organizations is
possible. Nevertheless, forest lands, like all other natural resources
in Vietnam, remain under state control (Vien, 2001; 2002).
Theoretically, farmers have the right to use allocated forest lands.
As stated in the Law for Forest Protection and Development (1991,
2004): “Land users will receive land use certiﬁcates and the state
shall protect the legal rights and interests of the land users. House-
holds and individuals receiving land allocated by the state will be
entitled to exchange, transfer, lease, inherit, and mortgage the land
use rights” (Article 1, 2, 3). Moreover, under Decree 02/CP, dated 15
January 1994, the state allocates forest lands to households for a
period of 50 years.
In practice, however, the state can overrule these land use
rights. For the previous forest protection programs (i.e. Decision
327 and 661), the state obliged farmers to plant certain types of
trees, regardless of how farmers perceive their livelihood options.
Moreover, in areas where farmers practice shifting cultivation, the
allocation of land use rights might ironically weaken farmers'
actual rights, especially when farmers would prefer to continue
with their slash and burn cultivation, rather than implement forest
protection practices (Vien, 2001).
Though the pilot PFES schemes in Lam Dong and Son La
provinces do not incorporate land use change as part of the
programs, it is possible that the state may use the additional
ﬁnancial incentives from the FPDF to ensure that farmers grow
certain types of crops in speciﬁc locations (regardless of their
existing land use or livelihood options), if such measures are
necessary to ensure effective forest protection. As stated in the
Decision by the Prime Minister: “Reforestation should be carried out
with species suitable to the protection requirement of areas with
different climate and soil conditions. Species which provide effective
protection, can stand severe climate; poor soil, steep slopes, grow
along the sea coast and also can resist pests and diseases as well as
ﬁre are to be preferred” (Decision by the Prime Minister on
Objectives, Tasks, Policies and Organization for the Establishment
of Five Million Hectares of New Forest, 1998, Article 4).
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In Vietnam, the government is fully authorized to manage PES
funds in line with its goals and interests in forest protection and
watershed management, as payment is incorporated as part of the
government revenue system. The government deﬁnes the overall
payment arrangements, collects, and manages the funds for PES
program through its Forest Protection and Development Fund.
Transaction and fund channeling for PES implementation is
governed by the state (Government Decree on the Policy on
Payment for Forest Environment Services, 24 September 2010,
Article 14). No negotiations occur between the respective hydro-
power company as fund provider, and farmers as service providers,
regarding the amount of funds, types of services, or payment
intervals. Hydropower companies, water utilities and tourism
companies provide a portion of their environmental fee for PES
application because they are obliged to do so by the government.
In turn, they pay the environmental fee to the government rather
than channel it directly to farmers, or to farming communities as
the service providers.
4.3. PES implementation through centralized state administration
PES implementation might take place without direct participa-
tion from farmers or other stakeholders, given the state's centra-
lized administration system. The two pilot PFES schemes in Lam
Dong and Son La provinces are implemented relying mainly on
government structure and apparatuses from the national down to
the village level (To et al., 2012; Winrock International, 2011).
The way PES programs are currently implemented, relying
mainly on state apparatuses and structure does not necessarily
result in equal distribution of program beneﬁts. For example, 7To
et al. (2012, p. 247) suggest that in Lam Dong and Son La Provinces,
income from PES programs does not reach the poor, due to
political and economic constraints: “The distribution of payments
to households was based on formal land data records from past land
allocation and forest protection programs. This means that house-
holds established after land allocation were automatically excluded
from payment schemes. This number is not small, as the land
allocation process commenced in 1995 in many provinces. Clearly,
when PES policy is scaled up nationally, a signiﬁcant number of poor
will be unable to access PES schemes and beneﬁt from associated
payments”.
Regarding Programs 327 and 661, for instance, the state
essentially has not consulted farmers regarding land suitability,
crop selection, or livelihood options (Cai, 1999). Article 5 in the
Decision by the Prime Minister on Objectives, Tasks, Policies and
Organization for the Establishment of Five Million Hectares of New
Forest (1998) assigned the task of identifying forest protection
areas solely to the People's Committees.5. Discussion
Despite the neoliberal logic incorporated in the concept, PES
application in Vietnam demonstrates that PES can be applied as an
integral part of the state's centralized planning system. Here, PES
serves as another tool that can be used by the state in accordance
with its various objectives (e.g. to fund forest conservation
programs or to reduce poverty). In this light, PES programs can
potentially become part and parcel of the government strategy to
strengthen state control over forest lands and land uses.
While PES implementation in Vietnam serves the government's
goal of generating additional revenue (primarily from hydropower
development) to fund forest protection activities, the impacts on
farm households and implications for poverty reduction ordeepening remain unclear (Christiansen et al., 2005; Leimona
et al., 2009; Lovera, 2004; McElwee, 2012; To et al., 2012). In line
with earlier studies on the impacts of PES implementation on farm
households (Gauvin et al., 2010; Uchida et al., 2005), our Vietnam
case study indicates how PES implementation is hampered by the
problem of high transaction costs and land tenure issues.
While the way PES is implemented in Vietnam might result in
better forest protection (i.e. through the provision of ﬁnancial
incentives as an additional means to compel participation), it also
highlights the shaping of PES as a potential tool for internal
territorialization. The implementation of PES in Vietnam resem-
bles that of China's Sloping Land Conservation Program (SLCP),
which the Chinese government designed in a top-down fashion,
involving limited consultation with local communities. Farm
households are offered simple contracts, which they are encour-
aged to sign, through a campaign style mobilization program
(Bennett, 2008). The SLCP, known also as the Grain for Green
Program, has led to the afforestation of millions of hectares of
sloping lands in western China, with consequent reductions in soil
erosion and improvements in watershed management (Liu et al.,
2008). Payments to farm households have been well received, but
the government expenditures at the national and local levels have
been substantial.
Vietnam's centralized planning does not rule out the possibility
that PES program design entails political choices about which
classes of people, in which locations, will have access to natural
resources and their beneﬁts, now and in the future (McAfee, 1999).
In this light, PES program application by the state can resemble
some aspects of green grabbing (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen
(2010); Fairhead et al., 2012), in which farmers are forced to work
on forest lands to achieve a state's policy goals (Donovan et al.,
1997; Vien, 2001).
From the perspective of environmental conservation, the ques-
tion remains whether PES can fully compensate for the negative
environmental impacts of hydropower development in general,
and with regard to forest loss in particular. According to its energy
sector master plan, Vietnam will increase its power production
from 9200 MW in 2011 to 17,400 MW in 2020. As part of this plan,
the government plans to build 55 large-scale and 40 small-scale
hydropower plants. Financially, the plan will result in increased
government revenue for forest protection. Nevertheless, rapid
hydropower development might also result in the loss of 40,809
ha of rich forest land and 1,089,762 ha of forest land in general 7
(To, 2012). These estimates of forest loss are based on the
assumption of 62.63 ha of forest land loss per 1 MW, and 2.35 ha
of rich forest loss per 1 MW (To, 2012). These estimates are not
precise, as they are based on a linear extrapolation of energy
development in relation to forest lost, without accounting for the
type of hydropower reservoir or the types of forest areas cleared.
Yet the estimates provide some indication of the scope and degree
of hydropower development impacts on forest land. From To et al.
(2012, p. 245): “Large areas of forest in Son La province, most of
which were already allocated to households, have been cleared for
hydropower plants and many new settlements have been set up for
villagers displaced as a consequence”.6. Conclusions
Our Vietnam case study highlights the dissonance in PES
program design and implementation. PES programs are imple-
mented as part of the government's policies in natural resource
management. The government deﬁnes the payment framework,
regulates the payment mechanisms, decides on the types of
services, identiﬁes the buyers and sellers of ecosystem services,
and ensures that the ‘transaction’ or the payment occurs. 7 In
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the provision of the services is not secured. This is in sharp
contrast with the notion that PES programs involve well-deﬁned
environmental services and voluntary transactions between
buyers and sellers (Wunder, 2005).
The dissonance in Vietnam's PES program design and imple-
mentation is driven primarily by the government's interest in
using PES to generate additional revenue for forest protection and
watershed management. With PES, the Vietnamese government
employs the idea of market environmentalism to justify its goals of
increasing revenue to ﬁnance forest protection. Yet, by reshaping
the overall PES program design from a mechanism to cope with
the classic problem of negative externalities into a tool to generate
additional revenue, the state may be able to sustain and expand its
role and importance in natural resource management. In turn, the
scope and degree of PES programs may be reduced into merely a
government subsidy scheme.
To conclude, we have highlighted the importance of under-
standing the governance structure in which PES programs are
implemented. From To et al. (2012, p. 237): “as PES schemes create a
market for ecosystem services, such markets must be understood not
simply as bald economic exchanges between ‘rational actors’ but
rather as exchanges embedded in particular socio-political and
historical context to support the sustainable use of forest resources
and local livelihoods.” Such understanding is important not only for
increasing program signiﬁcance, but also for describing the ratio-
nale behind PES program adoption, and determining whether or
not the rationale is consistent with the original concept 7of
voluntary transactions involving payments for well-deﬁned eco-
system services.References
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